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Great Britain and the Consular Initiative of the Great Powers  
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875
Abstract: This paper examines on the basis of the British archival records the attitude of 
Great Britain towards the consular initiative of the Great Powers in August and Septem-
ber 1875. It was the first joint undertaking of the European powers in the Great Eastern 
Crisis (1875–1878). In the British view, it was the ambitions of the League of the Three 
Emperors in the Balkans and Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina that underpinned 
the initiative. Although the consuls had limited authority, Britain accepted the initiative 
with reluctance and mistrust – and only after the Ottoman Empire had given its consent. 
When the League of the Three Emperors proposed more extensive powers for the con-
suls in order to prevent the failure of their mission, both the Ottoman Empire and Great 
Britain declined this proposal. This meant that the Consular Mission could accomplish 
nothing. 
Keywords: Great Britain, Great Eastern Crisis, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs, Austria-Hun-
gary, Consular Mission
Great Britain’s policy in the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 has been discussed in several monographs.1 This Great Power played the key role 
in that momentous crisis. However, the British attitude towards the Serbian 
question, which was central to the uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the wars 
of 1876–78, has not been explored. Serbian historiography has not produced a 
comprehensive and thorough account of the events that constituted the Great 
Eastern Crisis either.2 Therefore, this paper, which aims to continue earlier re-
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1  R. W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question. A Study in Diplomacy 
and Party Politics (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1971); R. Millman, Britain and the East-
ern Question 1875–1878 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); M. Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern 
Question (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011). 
2  Nevertheless, there are some important works: M. Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875–1878 
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search on Britain’s policy towards the Serbian question at the time, particularly 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina,3 may be seen both as a study on British foreign policy 
and as a contribution to Serbian national history and to our knowledge, still not 
complete, of the Great Eastern Crisis.
There is no study of the consular initiative. It lasted from 19 August to 28 
September 1875 and marked the first attempt of the European Powers to take a 
joint stance in the Great Eastern Crisis. A similar commission composed of con-
suls appointed by the Great Powers had been formed in 1861, during an earlier 
uprising in Herzegovina, but it had failed because of the lack of Ottoman sup-
port. The main goal of the consular mission in 1875 was to prevent the insurgen-
cy from spreading to neighbouring countries and turning into an international 
crisis. It also ended in failure, but it showed, as will be seen, that London was 
right in suspecting that the members of the Three Emperors’ League intended to 
take initiative and try to exploit the events in the Balkans to their own benefit.4
The intentions of the signatories of the Three Emperors’ League had 
raised doubts ever since it came into being in 1873. Formally, it was a recon-
struction of the alliance between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany, the 
three strongholds of European conservatism and the guardians of the order es-
tablished at the Congress of Berlin in 1814–1815. In the spirit of the Holy Alli-
ance, these three empires declared that they would protect the peace of Europe 
against all revolutionary attempts after the bloodshed of the Paris Commune. 
versity Press, 1939). See also the publicist but thorough monograph by V. M. Gutić, Opšta 
i diplomatska istorija ustanka u Hercegovini i Bosni iz 1875–1878, 2 vols. (Belgrade: Filip 
Višnjić, 2016). 
3  For a synthesis on the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see D. T. Bataković, The Serbs of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: History and Politics (Paris: Dialogue, 1996); see also several arti-
cles by M. Ković: “Vojvoda Argajl i Istočno pitanje“, Tema: Akademik Dragoljub Živojinović, 
Mitološki zbornik 19 (2008), 129–145; “Velika Britanija i Bosna i Hercegovina u Istočnoj 
krizi (1875–1878)”, Zbornik za istoriju Bosne i Hercegovine 6 (Belgrade: SANU, 2009), 159–
173; “The Beginning of the 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina: The British Perspective”, 
Balcanica XLI (2010), 55–71; “Misija Roberta Lojd-Lindzija u Srbiji 1876”, Istorijski časopis 
LX (2011), 377–391; “Britanci i Hadži-Lojina revolucija: Konzul Edvard Frimen o pobuni 
i okupaciji Sarajeva 1878”, Mešovita gradja/Miscelanea, n.s. XXXII (2011), 381–414; “Dve 
imperije: Britanci i Osmanlije (1774–1923)”, in Turska: regionalna sila? eds. M. Djurković and 
A. Raković (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 2013), 191–204; and “Disraeli’s Oriental-
ism Reconsidered”, Serbian Political Thought 7–13 (2016), 5–14.
4  On the 1875 consular mission see D. Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis 
of 1875–1878: The First Year (Stanford, London and Oxford: Stanford University Press and 
Oxford University Press, 1936), 88–98; Čubrilović, Bosanski ustanak, 87–92; Stojanović, The 
Great Powers and the Balkans, 22–25; Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question 1875–1878, 
23; Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question, 21; Ković, Disraeli and the 
Eastern Question, 90. On the 1861 consular mission see D. Berić, Ustanak u Hercegovini 1852–
1862 (Bileća and Gacko: SPKD Prosvjeta, 2007), 700–770. 
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The three emperors committed themselves to opposing not just socialists, but 
also nationalists. They agreed specifically to prevent the realisation of “Greater 
Serbian” plans and any disturbance of the Balkan status quo.5
The Conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (1874–1880) was 
in control of British foreign policy. He was convinced that the Three Emper-
ors’ League had been formed in order for its members to exploit the decline of 
France and Britain’s isolation for the purpose of dividing the remaining Otto-
man lands. The League had emerged immediately after the defeat of France in 
the war against Prussia and the North German Confederation. The two western 
Powers, Britain and France, had for centuries guaranteed the maintenance of the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe. On the other hand, the three conservative Powers 
had been traditional enemies of the Turks. The Romanovs and Habsburgs had 
waged war against the Ottomans for centuries and expanded their domains at 
their expense. Furthermore, Russia seized the opportunity offered by the Fran-
co-Prussian War to announce the return of her fleet to the Black Sea, which 
annulled the most important stipulation of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856.6 
The Serb uprising in Herzegovina only strengthened Disraeli’s concerns. 
Both he and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby (Edward Henry Stanley, earl 
of Derby), were convinced that Austria-Hungary had stirred the rebellion. 
The same was believed in Paris. Indeed, the uprising was preceded by the se-
cret meeting of the Viennese Crown Council in January 1875 which decided 
that Austria-Hungary would occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina if there was a danger 
that these provinces might be absorbed by Serbia and Montenegro. The military 
governor of Austrian Dalmatia, General Gavrilo Rodić (Gabriel von Rodich), 
undertook a series of measures designed to collect information and strengthen 
the position of the Dual Monarchy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In April and May, 
Emperor Francis Joseph visited Dalmatia and heard the complaints made by 
Herzegovinian Roman Catholics. He then met in Kotor with the Russian pro-
tégé, the Montenegrin Prince Nicholas Petrović, who requested support from 
the Three Emperors’ League for Montenegro’s territorial expansion into Her-
zegovina immediately after their meeting. The Herzegovinian Catholics started 
the rebellion in June 1875. Eye-witnesses reported that Austro-Hungarian flags 
had been flown over their positions. It was only later that the uprising spread 
to the Orthodox Christian part of Herzegovina, while it almost died down in 
5  V. M. Khvostov, Istoria diplomatii II 1878–1914 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1963), 34–41; G. H. Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Aus-
tria 1876–1878 (Harvard, London and Oxford: Harvard University Press and Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1941), 17–23.
6  Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, 76–90.
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the Catholic areas. The aid for the insurgents was coming from Dalmatia and 
Montenegro.7 
London also suspected Serbia of being involved in Austro-Russian plans 
to dismember the Ottoman Empire since the time Prince Milan Obrenović had 
paid visit to Vienna and met Emperor Francis Joseph and Foreign Minister, 
Count Julius Andrássy, in early August 1875. Moreover, volunteers from Serbia 
were going to Herzegovina. The suspicions were confirmed by the news that 
Prince Milan, upon returning from Vienna, had dismissed the peaceful cabi-
net of Danilo Stefanović. After the election, the winning Liberal and bellicose 
government of Stevča Mihailović took office. During the consular mission in 
Herzegovina, reports constantly reached London on volunteers crossing from 
Serbia into Bosnia, bashi-bozouk detachments making raids from Bosnia into 
Serbia and troops being gathered on the border between Serbia and the Otto-
man Empire.8 
 There were two other bad news that reached the Foreign Office. The 
rebellion spread to Bosnia on 19 August. On the same day, the Russian Ambas-
sador in Constantinople, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, took the initiative 
that the Powers signatories of the 1856 Paris Treaty send their consuls to Her-
zegovina in a mediating mission. 
That could be the start of a definitive division of the Ottoman Empire 
between Russia and her allies from the Three Emperors’ League. But Prince 
Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov, Russian Foreign Minister, did not want the 
situation in the Balkans to deteriorate at that particular moment. He was in fa-
vour of the closest collaboration within the League and with other Powers with 
a view to bringing about a joint solution to Balkan crises. As a diplomat who 
had matured during the era of the Holy Alliance, he was in principle against all 
revolutionary turmoil, including the movements of Balkan nationalists. How-
ever, the influential Count Ignatiev had no confidence in any agreements with 
the western Powers which, in his view, used to combine against Russia and he 
was particularly distrustful of Austria-Hungary. Unlike Gorchakov, he did not 
want to negotiate about Austria-Hungary’s entry into Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
order to protect Russian interests in the eastern Balkans. He argued for set-
tling disputes in direct cooperation between Russia and Turkey, without any 
involvement of the western Powers. The aim was to work towards the formation 
7  Rupp, Wavering Friendship, 34–45; M. Ekmečić, Dugo kretanje izmedju klanja i oranja: 
Istorija Srba u Novom veku (1492–1992) (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007), 278–279; 
M. Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije, 2 vols (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1989), vol. II, 283–284; Ković, 
“Beginning of the 1875 Serbian Uprising”, 55–71. 
8  Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije, II, 255–256, 277–282; Č. Popov, “Srbija u Istočnoj krizi 
1875–1878“, in Istorija srpskog naroda, vol. V-1, ed. V. Stojančević, (Belgrade: Srpska književna 
zadruga, 1981), 369–373; Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, 92–93. 
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of an alliance between the Balkan national states under the auspices of Russia. 
That alliance and Russia would dismantle Ottoman rule at a favourable mo-
ment. Russian statesmen were divided into supporters of Ignatiev’s policy and 
supporters of the much more influential Gorchakov.9
The idea of taking consular initiative to deal with the rebellion was as-
cribed to Gorchakov’s people in Russian diplomacy, namely the Consul in Du-
brovnik, Alexander Petrovich Yonin, and the Ambassador in Vienna, Eugen 
Petrovich Novikov. Count Ignatiev was on the leave of absence at the moment 
when that decision was made in St. Petersburg. Emperor Alexander II, who 
personally favoured Ignatiev but always sided with Gorchakov, yielded to the 
demand of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Andrássy, to have 
negotiations held in Vienna. Shortly before the initiative, in August 1875, a spe-
cial “consultative conference”, a “centre for agreement” among the Powers of the 
Three Emperors’ League was established in Vienna. It was there that the in-
structions for the consular mission would be formulated in cooperation between 
Andrássy, pro-Austrian Novikov and the German Ambassador, General Hans 
Lothar von Schweintz.10
Ignatiev claimed that Austria-Hungary was involved in the outbreak of 
the Herzegovinian rebellion. He was bitter because Gorchakov was drawing 
European Powers, especially those inimical to Russia, into resolving the crisis 
and because Andrássy was now in charge of the situation. Ignatiev also believed 
that the rebellion had broken out too early. Austria-Hungary alone could benefit 
from it and it was thus necessary to make peace between the insurgents and the 
Turks. But Ignatiev had to follow Gorchakov’s instructions. Ignatiev instructed 
Consul Ivan Stepanovich Yastrebov, who was sent from Shkodra to Herzegov-
ina, to follow what had been agreed in Vienna, to examine together with other 
consuls what was the real situation and to encourage the insurgents to negotiate 
with the Sultan’s envoy in Herzegovina, Server Pasha.11
At the same time, Ignatiev’s main efforts were directed towards prevent-
ing Andrássy’s initiatives, suspecting them to be designed to lead to the occu-
pation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. In order to diminish the 
influence of the Viennese “consulting mission” in the second half of August, 
Ignatiev summoned in his residence a conference of the Ambassadors of the 
Great Powers, signatories of the Paris Treaty, to consider together the consular 
reports and agree on further steps to be taken. Among the decisions reached 
at that conference, outlined by Ignatiev, it was agreed that all Powers, that is to 
9  V. M. Khevrolina, Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev: Rosiskii diplomat (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2009, 
114–119, 136–151, 186–190, 219–221, 226–266.
10  Harris, Diplomatic History, 72–83.
11  N. P. Ignatiev to I. S. Yastrebov, Pera, 14 August 1875, in Rossiia i vosstanie v Bosnii i 
Gertsegovine 1875–1878: Dokumenti (Moscow: Indrik, 2008), 55–57. 
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say their representatives in the consular mission, make their communications 
through Yastrebov, who was the only one with codes and special couriers to be 
in contact with Constantinople. But the idea of a conference in Constantinople 
failed because of the opposition of Gorchakov and his chief associate in the For-
eign Ministry, Baron Alexander Henrikovich Jomini. Ignatiev bitterly noted that 
another attempt on his part to keep in check Vienna’s ambitions in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina had failed.12 As British records will show, he would not give up easily.
The British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, reported to 
Lord Derby on 20 August 1875 on the initiative originating from Vienna which 
was supposed to be presented to the Sultan on behalf of the Three Emperors’ 
League. In Elliot’s view, the purpose of the consular mission was to let the in-
surgents know that they should give up the rebellion, that they could expect no 
external support, and to direct them to negotiate with the Sultan’s special envoy. 
The French Ambassador in Constantinople said that his country was prepared 
to join the initiative. The Grand Vizier was also willing to accept the idea, but he 
asked of Britain to be part of it. He stressed that the Ottoman government had 
“perfect confidence” in the British Consul in Sarajevo, William Richard Holmes, 
who had already been in Mostar.13 
Disraeli was rather suspicious, but he was left with little choice after the 
Turkish consent. He told Derby that he “does not like it, but see it is inevitable”.14 
Replying to Elliot’s dispatch, Derby accepted the participation of Britain in the 
consular mission, but only “with great reluctance” and because the Sublime 
Porte had requested it. He underlined that the British government “would have 
thought it better that the Porte should have dealt with the insurgents, without 
foreign intervention of any kind”.15 Disraeli, Derby and Elliot made it clear that, 
in their view, the best solution for the crisis in Herzegovina was a rapid suppres-
sion of the rebellion by the Ottomans.16
Elliot observed that the Porte’s success in suppressing the insurrection 
would depend on the willingness of Austria-Hungary to prevent volunteers, 
money and munitions crossing from Dalmatia into Herzegovina. An advantage 
of the consular mission was, in his view, that the Habsburg Monarchy com-
12  N. P. Ignatiev, Zapiski (1875–1878) (Sofia: Otechestveni front, 1986), 78–90; Khevrolina, 
Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, 262–265. 
13  The National Archives (TNA), Foreign Office (FO), 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), 
Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 20 August 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 460), Elliot to 
Derby, Therapia, 20 August 1875.
14  24 August 1875, The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826–93). Be-
tween September 1869 and March 1878, ed. J. Vincent (London: UCL, 1994), 239. 
15  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 258), Derby to Elliot, London, 24 August 1875.
16  Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, 87–90; Harris, Diplomatic History, 87–88. 
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mitted itself to non-interference and cooperation with the other Powers.17 In a 
telegram of 27 August, he relayed to Derby the joint instructions for the consuls 
which stipulated, along with the necessity that the insurgents lay down their 
arms, negotiate with the Sultan’s envoy and abandon any hope in the support of 
the Great Powers, that the consuls were forbidden to advocate any other mea-
sures beyond what the insurgents might agree on with the Porte’s representa-
tive.18 Derby was also informed about the instructions which Server Pasha had 
received just before he had left for Mostar.19
Elliot forwarded to Derby on 26 August the instructions he had sent to 
Consul Holmes, a member of the mission. Those were, as had been agreed, in 
compliance with the instructions of the other Ambassadors in Constantinople. 
Moreover, Elliot was familiar with the instructions Ignatiev had given to Yas-
trebov. Holmes was ordered to hear the complaints made by the insurgents so 
as to be able to report on the real situation, to be reserved and not to give them 
any reason to believe that they could receive support. It should be made clear 
to them that there was no prospect whatsoever of receiving assistance from the 
Great Powers. Holmes had to direct them to negotiating with the Sultan’s envoy. 
The consuls were not expected even to be present during those negotiations. 
Holmes was supposed to conduct himself in such a manner as to make it clear 
that he was a representative of a Power friendly to the Ottoman Empire. In par-
ticular, he had to avoid anything that might look to the Turks as a joint under-
taking of the consuls and to make sure he was working on his own. Holmes was 
also informed about the pressure which the Great Powers exerted on Serbia and 
Montenegro to stop them from aiding the insurgents in Bosnia-Herzegovina.20
Holmes was the first member of the consular mission to arrive in Mostar 
on 20 August together with Dervish Pasha, Governor-General of Bosnia un-
popular among the local Christians. Even without Elliot’s instructions, Holmes’ 
reports brimmed with sympathy for the Turks and hostility to the insurgents. 
On 22 August he reported that Dervish Pasha cried while he was describing 
how the insurgents “spitted and roasted two children before their parents, whom 
they afterwards murdered”.21 He was dead set against the Christians’ demand 
and the subsequent decision of the Porte to replace Dervish Pasha. He depicted, 
based on the news he received from the Turks, how the rebels burned Nevesinje 
17  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 25 August 1875; 
TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 474), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 25 August 1875.
18  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 27 August 1875.
19  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Musurus Pasha to Derby, London, 11 September 1875, 
Inclosure 1 and 2.
20  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 479), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 26 August 1875, Inclo-
sure 1 and 2.
21  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 22 August 1875.
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to the ground and killed all the women and children they laid their hands on in 
the town.22
Elliot also claimed, based on Server Pasha’s reports from Mostar, that 
the insurgents “pillaged and destroyed upwards to seventy villages”.23 Comment-
ing on the letters which John Russell, earl of Russell, favourable to the rebels, 
published in the Times and the reports on Turkish atrocities in Herzegovina of 
the Times correspondent, William James Stillman,24 Elliot professed that such 
writing served only to encourage the rebellion and further aggravate the situa-
tion. He argued, contrary to the Times, that the rebels were but bandits and that 
the whole movement was characterized by pillaging and killing of Muslim civil-
ians.25 As it would turn out, this was the beginning of a split in British public 
opinion in which Elliot would be labelled a soulless executor of the Benjamin 
Disraeli government’s immoral policy in the East.
On 23 September, there were news about the end of the mission and the 
return of the consuls to Mostar. They reported that the rebels refused to negoti-
ate with the Turks except in the presence of the representatives of Great Pow-
ers and demanded an armistice prior to the negotiations.26 That was, however, 
outside the scope of the consuls’ authorisation. 
Holmes also reported that the insurgents wanted a ceasefire and a guar-
antee from the European Powers. Having returned to Mostar on 22 September 
together with his Russian and French colleagues, he informed Elliot about the 
failure of the consular mission. He reiterated his conviction that “Serbian agita-
tion” caused the rebellion and that the insurgents would be content to remain 
under the rule of the Sultan with some improvement in their material situation. 
The Austro-Hungarian, German and Italian consuls arrived in Mostar the next 
day.27 
Holmes submitted to Elliot a detailed report on the consular mission 
on 28 September and forwarded it to Derby two days later. The consuls moved 
22  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 30 August 1875; TNA, FO, 
1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 2 September 1875.
23  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 535), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 8 September 1875.
24  See W. J. Stillman, Herzegovina and the Late Uprising: The Causes of the Latter and the 
Remedies (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1877); R. Subić, Stilman i Balkanski ustanci 
(1866–1878) (Belgrade: Phoenix Press, 2016), 77-103. 
25  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 543), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 10 September 1875.
26  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Buchanan to Derby, Vienna, 25 September 
1875.
27  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 6), Holmes to Derby, Mostar, 24 September 1875, 
Inclosures 1, 2; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 26 
September 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 594), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 26 Sep-
tember 1875.
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through Herzegovina in two groups. The British, Russian and French consuls 
headed to Nevesinje and Gacko, whereas their Austro-Hungarian, German 
and Italian colleagues went to Trebinje and Zupce.28 From 12 to 22 September, 
Holmes’ group spent their time in Nevesinje and then among the Herzegovin-
ian rebels in Biograd and Trusina. They did not meet with the principal leaders; 
they were told these were busy fighting the Turks. Still, they managed to gain a 
clear insight into their demands. After all the failed reforms and agreements, the 
insurgents did not believe any guarantees coming from Server Pasha and other 
Turks. They requested the presence and guarantees of the Great Powers in the 
course of negotiations. The consuls could not promise that, but Holmes never-
theless concluded in his report that under the existing critical conditions the me-
diation of the Great Powers was a better possibility than the increasingly likely 
Austro-Hungarian occupation. At the advice of the rebels, the consuls headed 
to Bileća instead of Gacko, but they were surprised to run into Turkish troops 
near Stoce marching to attack the insurgents gathered in Trusina for their talks 
with the consuls. Once they had realised that their lives were in danger, since the 
Turks attacked the rebels only a few hours after their departure, and that the 
confidence of rebels in them would be destroyed by the Turkish offensive, the 
consuls cancelled the visit to Bileća and decided to wait for the return of their 
colleagues in Mostar.29
A few days later, Holmes was given a detailed memorandum in Italian 
on the position and demands of the insurgents titled “To the Representatives of 
European Powers in Bosnia-Herzegovina” and dated 17 September 1875. This 
“pamphlet”, as Holmes called it, was translated into English and forwarded to his 
superiors in London on 1 October. It was a lengthy and thorough account of all 
taxes imposed by the state and sipahis, and of the available evidence about judi-
cial abuses and the absence of even the basic protection of life, honour and prop-
28  The French Consul in Mostar, Dozon, travelled with Holmes and Yastrebov. The mission 
which headed to Trebinje in order to meet with Trivko Vukalović, Luka Petković and Mića 
Ljubibratić in Zupce consisted of the Austro-Hungarian Consul in Shkodra, Von Wassitsch, 
the German Consul in Dubrovnik, Von Lichtemberg, the Italian Consul in Bosnia and a 
member of the Danube Commission, Durando. See Harris, Diplomatic History, 90.  
29  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 28 September 1875; also see 
TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 23 September 1875; TNA, FO, 
1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 24 September 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 
1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 26 September 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes 
to Elliot, Mostar, 27 September 1875. Elliot also had to report to Derby that the Russian and 
French Consuls had informed their Ambassadors in Constantinople how the Turks had used 
the occasion of the meeting between the Consuls and the insurgents to attack the latter. See 
TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 24 September 1875; 
TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 607), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 September 1875; Har-
ris, Diplomatic History, 93.
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erty in Herzegovina. In conclusion, it was suggested that Bosnia-Herzegovina 
be established as an autonomous state with a Christian ruler, or “to put a strong 
body of troops from some neighbouring State into the principal cities of the 
Province”, along with the appointment of representatives of European Powers to 
judicial institutions.30
Holmes had to admit that he could not dispute the content of this docu-
ment, although he pointed out that it was biased in favour of the insurgents. On 
the basis of that document and his own observations, he compiled a list of the 
most necessary tax, judicial and administrative reforms.31 Holmes would later 
report to Derby and Elliot that the author of the memorandum was “a very re-
spectable man, the Catholic Bishop of Mostar”.32
However, Yastrebov and Ignatiev did not share Holmes’s pessimism. Yas-
trebov’s report was written with much sympathy for the rebels. He described 
how they cried while telling him about Turkish atrocities. He enumerated the 
same complaints as the abovementioned memorandum which clearly had been 
handed to him as well. His report, however, also contained the complaints by 
the insurgents about the avarice of the Greek bishops and their hostility to the 
Herzegovinian Serbs.33
In conversations with Elliot, Ignatiev criticised the instructions for the 
consuls coming from Vienna and pointed out Andrássy’s ambitions. For those 
reasons, he stressed that he preferred the idea of cooperation between all the 
Powers, signatories of the Paris Treaty of 1856, to the action of the Three Em-
perors’ League. He assured the British Ambassador that the autonomy of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, which was known to have been championed by Gorchakov, 
was impossible of achievement. He suggested that the consuls be authorised to 
discuss matters with Server Pasha and then make a plan of reforms in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. He also assured Elliot that all the Ambassadors in Constantinople 
backed this idea. It was necessary, he claimed, to bring the uprising to an end, 
secure peace and introduce moderate reforms, which could be applied to other 
parts of the Ottoman Empire as well. Elliot was satisfied with what he had heard 
from Ignatiev. However, he rejected the proposal, stating that Turkey and Brit-
ain had accepted the idea of the consular mission only with the clear and limited 
mandate. From a conversation with the French Ambassador in Constantinople, 
De Bourgoing, Elliot understood that he was prepared to send instructions for 
expanding the scope of the consular mission. Moreover, Ignatiev handed an of-
ficial note to Elliot, in which he proposed that the consuls exchange opinions 
30  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 1 October 1875.
31  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 5 October 1875.
32  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 13 October 1875. 
33  I. S. Yastrebov – N. P. Ignatiev, Mostar, 15 sentiabria 1875, Rossiia i vosstanie v Bosnii i 
Gertsegovine, 117–120.
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with Server Pasha and then send to the Ambassadors in Constantinople “si c’est 
possible, un project de solution pratique et acceptable pour tout le monde”. This 
document also claimed that the Ambassadors of Austria-Hungary, France and 
Italy were in agreement with such a step. Ignatiev again warned Elliot in a letter 
of Vienna’s ambitions, suggesting that it would be much better to settle the crisis 
in Constantinople in cooperation with the Porte.34 However, Elliot remained 
cautious and persistent, and instructed Holmes again not to participate in the 
joint actions of the consuls. He asked to be informed about the course of the 
mission and the discussions with Server Pasha and fellow consuls.35 
Andrássy expressed his moderate optimism in a conversation with the 
British Ambassador in Vienna, Andrew Buchanan, on 23 September. He waited 
for an official report on the consular mission before considering further mea-
sures for calming down the rebellion.36 Four days later, Andrássy still had no 
detailed information. He then received a telegram from the consul in the pres-
ence of Buchanan in which a suggestion was made that negotiations between the 
insurgents and Turks be held in Dubrovnik with representatives of the Great 
Powers present. Andrássy considered it too big a concession to be asked of the 
Turks and expressed hope that the proposal could be modified. He also point-
ed out to Buchanan his dissatisfaction because of the articles published in the 
Times, which argued for the autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.37
Odo Russell, Ambassador in Berlin, noted the full unanimity of the 
members of the Three Emperors’ League in advocating what he described as 
“improvement of the status quo” in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He observed a general 
favourableness of German public opinion to the insurgents.38 As expected, the 
news about favourable attitude of Russian public opinion towards the insur-
gents was coming from St. Petersburg.39 Reports from Constantinople, Vien-
na, Berlin and St. Petersburg only contributed to London’s fear of the League’s 
34  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 565. Very confidential), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 17 
September 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 596.), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 26 
September 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 597.), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 26 Sep-
tember 1875, Inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4.
35  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 26 September 1875.
36  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 303. Confidential), Buchanan to Derby, Vienna, 23 
September 1875.
37  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Buchanan to Derby, Vienna, 27 September 
1875.
38  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 397. Confidential), Russell to Derby, Berlin, 24 Septem-
ber 1875.
39  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 307. Very confidential), Doria to Derby, St Petersburg, 
12 October 1875.
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plans. Elliot appreciated that Ignatiev was trying to take over initiative from the 
hands of Andrássy, but that could not do away with his suspicions.
The League’s Ambassadors in Constantinople met on 26 September to 
discuss the reports of the consuls. The mission could be regarded as a failure, 
since the consuls reported that the insurgents refused to negotiate without guar-
antees from the European Powers. The Ambassadors thus broadened the scope 
of the consular instructions. They were told to have a discussion with Server 
Pasha after their conversations with the rebels and then to propose measures 
which would satisfy both sides. The French Ambassador gave his assent later.40 
On the same day, Ignatiev tried, as has been seen, to win over Elliot for that idea.
On the next day, however, the consuls, including Holmes, accepted the 
proposal made by the Austro-Hungarian member of the mission, Conrad von 
Wassitsch, to the effect that following an armistice a conference be organised 
between the insurgents and Turks in Dubrovnik in which the consuls would 
also take part.41 Judging by Andrássy’s reaction of the same day, he either feigned 
surprise in front of Buchanan or was not familiar with the idea of a conference 
in Dubrovnik.
 The Porte, however, firmly refused the broadening of the consular mis-
sion. The Grand Vizier, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, informed Elliot as early as 28 
September that he had not accepted the proposal for a conference in Dubrovnik 
between the consuls, Server Pasha and the insurgents. Elliot welcomed such 
decision, but he suggested to the Grand Vizier to have Server Pasha receive the 
consuls individually instead of having a conference in order to avoid an incident. 
After that, Mahmud Nedim Pasha reminded Server Pasha that he was only 
authorised to listen to the consuls’ individual opinions and not to negotiate with 
them collectively.42 
Elliot then found out that it was the German Ambassador in Constan-
tinople, Baron Carl von Werther, who had suggested the failed proposal to the 
Grand Vizier. Mahmud Nedim Pasha had replied to him that the consular mis-
sion had been ended after they had listened to the rebels, relayed to them the 
views of their governments and received from them a negative answer. But Igna-
tiev assured Elliot that his German colleague had made no proposal to the Porte 
and only passed on the view of the consuls.43
40  Harris, Diplomatic History, 94.
41  Ibid. 94–95.
42  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 September 1875, 
2.50 p.m.; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 604), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 September 
1875.
43  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic. Confidential), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 
September 1875, 3.00 p.m; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 610. Confidential), Derby to 
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Holmes confirmed, however, that there had been such an agreement. His 
telegram made it clear that he had agreed to the proposed measures:
My colleagues of Austria, France, Germany and Russia have received instruc-
tions to suggest a practical project acceptable to all for the pacification of the 
country. We agree that the only means would be a recognized constitution: 
Armistice: Reunion of the Commission with Server Pasha at Ragusa [Du-
brovnik], where his Excellency and the insurgents, with the co-operation, of the 
European Delegates, could easily discuss the details with the Pasha. This must 
be arranged at Constantinople, and I shall take no steps in this matter, without 
your Excellency’s instructions.44
This development was, in fact, a consequence of Ignatiev’s initiatives with 
a view to preventing Austria-Hungary’s rule over Bosnia-Herzegovina. But a 
conference in Dubrovnik was not his idea. After the Turks’ rejection and the 
British resistance, Ignatiev backed down temporarily. He informed Elliot that he 
had instructed Yastrebov not to exceed the initial mandate of his mission. The 
French Ambassador in Constantinople did the same.45 Elliot then reminded 
Holmes again of his instructions.46 Derby sent a special telegram to approve of 
Elliot’s message.47
Ignatiev now claimed that the initiative for expanding the consuls’ authori-
sation had originated with Andrássy and that he had even proposed that a con-
ference in Dubrovnik be held between the consuls and the rebel leaders, without 
Turkish representatives. The Russian Ambassador continued, however, to per-
suade Elliot that the Great Powers ambassadors in Constantinople rather than 
in Vienna should deal with the solution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.48 
In a long report to Derby written on 28 September, Elliot assessed that 
at the moment there were two, almost equally bad, possibilities for resolving 
the crisis. The first one was an intervention on the part of the Three Emperors’ 
Elliot, London, 28 September 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 611. Confidential), 
Derby to Elliot, London, 29 September 1875.
44  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 27 September 1875; TNA, FO, 
1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 600), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 September 1875. 
45  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 September 1875, 
10.00 p.m; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 604), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 September 
1875.
46  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 September 1875, 
11.00 p.m.
47  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, (Telegraphic), Derby to Elliot, London, 1 October 1875, 
2.25 p.m.
48  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 606. Confidential), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, Lon-
don, 28 September 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Confidential. Telegraphic), Elliot to 
Derby, Therapia, 8 October 1875.
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League, without other Great Powers, to the benefit of Austria-Hungary, which 
the British diplomat considered the main threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
second possibility was an international conference, which could bring about the 
harmful involvement of Powers in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, 
but that would perhaps allow Britain to rein in the ambitions of the League and 
Austria-Hungary. Elliot did not trust Ignatiev, but he concluded that the latter 
really aimed at keeping Andrássy in check.49 
The British Ambassador was thus basically in agreement with Holmes’s 
opinion that European mediation would be necessary after all. More important-
ly, Elliot was correct in his assessment of Ignatiev’s intentions. The Russian Am-
bassador’s initiatives were welcome insofar as they could deepen a rift between 
St. Petersburg and Vienna and halt Austria-Hungary’s thrust in Bosnia-Herze-
govina. Nevertheless, Britain regarded any broadening of the consular mission 
as an impingement on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
The consular mission finally collapsed on 28 September. The last blow 
was dealt by the Ottomans and British. The Ottoman Foreign Minister, Safvet 
Pasha, stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Constantinople, Count 
Ferenc Zichy, that the Porte considered the consular mission over.50 
The consuls stayed for another several months in Mostar but without any 
impact on the events. Holmes reported on Server Pasha’s declarations of reform 
to which no one paid any attention.51 At the same time, he justified his partici-
pation in expanding the consular mandate by the danger of Austria-Hungary’s 
expansion into Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russia’s preparedness to exploit that to 
realise her interests in other parts of the Balkans. He repeated that it was neces-
sary to cease conflicts and, given the unwillingness of the Turks to undertake re-
forms, that that was possible only with the mediation of the European Powers.52
Ignatiev turned to his old idea of separate negotiations between Russia 
and Turkey with a view to persuading the Porte to carry out the necessary re-
forms. However, the subsequent Sultan’s irades and fermans had no effect on the 
situation in the rebellious provinces.53
Military tension in relations between Turkey and Serbia also subsided. 
On 4 October, Prince Milan dismissed the bellicose, Liberal, Serbian govern-
ment under the pressure of the Great Powers. That was welcomed with relief 
49  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 608), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 28 September 1875.
50  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 631), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 4 October 1875.
51  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 11 October 1875.
52  TNA, FO, 1875, 195, vol. 1061, Holmes to Elliot, Mostar, 13 October 1875.
53  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39, Musurus Pasha to Derby, London, 5 October 1875, Inclo-
sure 1; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 621), Elliot to Derby, Therapia, 2 October 1875.
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in Britain’s capital.54 Satisfied because of the change of government in Serbia, 
Disraeli wrote to Queen Victoria that “Herz: business seems virtually settled”.55 
The real complications in the Balkans, however, had just started.
***
The consular mission of August-September 1875 was the first joint undertak-
ing of European Powers in the Great Eastern Crisis. Behind this initiative the 
British statesmen saw the intention of the Three Emperors’ League (Russia, 
Austria-Hungary and Germany) to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Since the 
initial news of the uprising in Herzegovina had been received, London regarded 
the ambitions of Austria-Hungary as the main threat to Turkey.
 Indeed, Russia showed willingness to follow Austria-Hungary’s initia-
tives in Bosnia-Herzegovina on this occasion as well. The idea of the consular 
mission was a Russian one, but the instructions for the consuls were written in 
Vienna. Their limited mandate deprived the consuls from any substantial influ-
ence on the developments in the rebellious areas. Their failure to win over the 
insurgents for negotiations with the Sultan’s envoy, Server Pasha, without the 
mediation of European Powers marked the collapse of the mission. It was sealed 
with the sudden Turkish attack on the insurgents who assembled to negotiate 
with the consuls. The failed attempt in late September 1875 to have the consuls’ 
authorisation extended and to allow them to compose a plan of reforms result-
ed from Count Ignatiev’s attempt to transfer decision-making with regard to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina from Vienna to Constantinople. He wanted in that way to 
prevent the sliding of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the hands of Austria-Hungary, 
contrary to the intentions he sensed in Count Gorchakov’s entourage. 
The British Ambassador in Constantinople, Elliot, appreciated Ignatiev’s 
intention to oppose Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, despite all 
his mistrust, supported him to that end. Nevertheless, Britain regarded the 
broadening of the scope of the consular mission advocated by the Three Em-
perors’ League as an encroachment on the rights and the very existence of the 
Ottoman Empire. The refusal of the Porte to accept that idea and the support 
Britain extended to it marked the definitive end of the consular mission.   
54  TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (Telegraphic), White to Derby, Belgrade, 6 October 1875; 
TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 62), White to Derby, Belgrade, 8 October 1875; TNA, 
FO, 1875, 424, vol. 39 (No. 63), White to Derby, Belgrade, 8 October 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 
424, vol. 39 (No. 66), White to Derby, Belgrade, 9 October 1875; TNA, FO, 1875, 424, vol. 
39 (No. 659), Elliot to Derby, Belgrade, 12 October 1875.
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